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Core and Periphery in the European 
Monetary Union: Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
25 Years Later  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The seminal paper by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) highlights the 
existence of a core-periphery pattern in the run-up to the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). If persistent, this pattern would be detrimental to the EMU 
project. Using pre-EMU data to estimate the degree of supply shocks 
synchronization, they argue that there is a core (Germany, France, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Denmark) where shocks are highly correlated and a 
periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK) where 
synchronisation is significantly lower.   
The objective of this paper is to revisit Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) in 
order to evaluate the effect of the EMU on the core-periphery pattern they 
find using 1963-1988 data. We use the same estimation methodology, sample, 
and time window (25 years) to replicate their results for 1989-2015. We ask 
whether the EMU strengthened or weakened the core-periphery pattern. 
Based on a new over-identifying restriction test, our results suggest that the 
core-periphery pattern has actually weakened.   
 
 
2. Theory 
The main research question driving the scholarship on optimal currency areas 
(OCA) regards the costs and benefits of sharing a currency (Alesina and 
Barro, 2002). The main cost is the loss of monetary policy autonomy, while the 
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main benefits are transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty reductions, 
and increasing price transparency, trade and competition. OCA theory 
stresses labour mobility, product diversification and trade openness as criteria 
while debating the endogeneity of currency unions (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
Recent work highlights the role of credibility shocks: with varying degrees of 
commitment (time inconsistency), countries with dissimilar credibility shocks 
should join currency unions (Chari et al 2015). A second relevant recent 
strand highlights situations in which OCA criteria are modelled as 
interdependent. For instance, Farhi and Werning (2015) focus on interactions 
between openness and mobility. Recent econometric evidence showing the 
absence of a robust effect of currency unions on trade raises caveats to the 
discussion above (Glick and Rose, 2016).   
 
 
3. Estimation 
The methodology used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is an extension of 
the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure for decomposing permanent and 
temporary shocks. Consider a system where the true model is represented by 
an infinite moving average of a (vector) of variables,   , and shocks,   . Using 
the lag operator L, a bi-variate VAR featuring real GDP and its deflator can be 
written as an infinite moving average representation of demand and supply 
disturbances: 
                                 ∑  
     
 
       (1) 
where    ,       -  and the matrices   represent the impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of  . It follows that  
[
   
   
]  ∑   [
        
        
]    [
   
   
]        (2) 
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where   and    represent the logarithm of output and prices and    are        
disturbances, which identify supply and demand shocks (Ramey, 
forthcoming). For the i-th country,      represents element    , in matrix    
and so on. 
This framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on output, 
while demand shocks have temporary effects. Both have permanent 
(opposite) effects on prices. The cumulative effect of demand shocks on the 
change in output must be zero:  
 ∑       
 
             (3) 
Using the standard relation between the VAR’s residuals (  ) and demand 
and supply shocks, i.e.          for each country, exact identification of the C 
matrix requires four restrictions. Two are normalizations, which define the 
variance of the shocks     and    . The third restriction is from assuming that 
demand and supply shocks are orthogonal to each other. The fourth that 
demand shocks have only temporary effects on output (equation 3).  
Based on the standard AD-AS model, there is one restriction that Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1993) do not impose as their model was exactly identified. 
Here we extend their framework by imposing a fifth, additional over-
identifying restriction and we explicitly test for a permanent effect of supply 
shocks on output by imposing ∑       
 
   , where    . Accordingly, 
demand in each country is restricted to respond to supply shocks 
qualitatively (sign) and quantitatively (size) in the same way. In terms of the 
structural VAR analysis, this implies:  
∑ [
        
        
]    [
      
      
]  [
  
  
]        (4) 
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We do not restrict   a priori; instead, we vary   in the interval [0.1, 2] and 
choose its value optimally, as explained below (the number we chose to report 
is    .)  
 
3.1 Testing for over-identifying restriction 
In order to test for the over-identifying restriction described above, we 
estimate Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) SVAR model. Differently from 
them, we bootstrap the original VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate 
K = 10.000 data sets.  For each of the k-th samples we test for the over-
identifying restriction based on a LR-test. We record the number of rejections 
(NoR) of the over-identifying restriction test at each bootstrap replication, and 
calculate  
           
∑ {     |  (     )  
  (
    
 
)
 }
  
 
   
 
   (5) 
where    and    are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log likelihood 
function of the unrestricted and restricted regressions, respectively. Under   , 
the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of long-run restrictions ( ) minus (    )  , where   is the 
VAR-dimension (in this case    ). We calculate      for different values of 
 .  
Based on the results in Table 2A (Cf.  Appendix), we chose the value of   
which minimizes the total number of rejections in our sample. Demand and 
supply shocks are then retrieved by bootstrap, specifically by recalculating 
the VAR parameters (K = 10.000), identifying the SVAR and considering 
median values of structural disturbances under    .  
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4. Results 
Figure 1 shows our main results. The residuals (median bootstrapped) are 
retrieved from a Structural VAR with two lags for all countries, no constant, 
and using yearly data with respect to Germany closely following Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1993). The over-identifying restriction is imposed and the 
sample is 1989–2015. As dispersion has decreased compared to the pre-EMU 
era, we argue the results suggest the core-periphery pattern has weakened 
after 1989.  
Figure 1: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances imposing the over-identifying 
restriction (bootstrapped residuals – median values) 
 
Note: This figure reports median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000 VAR replications. 
Structural residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above is 
imposed for all countries. The sample for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for all countries 
and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). The demand and supply disturbances 
correlation coefficients vis-à-vis Germany are reported in Appendix Table 3A. 
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Figure 2: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances (bootstrapped residuals – 
median values) relaxing the over-identifying restriction 
 
Note: This figure reports median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000 VAR replications. 
Structural residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above is 
imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample 
for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). The demand and supply disturbances correlation coefficients   are reported 
in Appendix Table 4A. 
Based on the bootstrapped VAR, we test for the over-identifying restriction 
described above where (non) rejection supports classifying the country as 
periphery (centre). The four countries for which the rejection of the over-
identifying restriction is stronger, at conventional significance levels, are 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal (Table 2A in the Appendix).1 Without 
imposing this over-identifying restriction for these four countries, the core-
periphery pattern in Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s terms actually weakens even 
further. When the over-identifying restriction is not imposed, Ireland and 
Portugal move down the demand-axis and Greece and Spain jump to the left 
(Figure 2).  
                                                 
1
 The UK shows an ambiguous development: higher correlation of supply shocks but lower correlation 
of demand shocks. 
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Overall, our results support a re-interpretation of the core-periphery pattern: 
after EMU a new, smaller periphery emerges (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece) and its dynamics is systematically different from the rest in that, for 
these countries, the over-identifying restriction is rejected by the data in most 
cases.    
One important concern is that the relationship between demand and supply 
may have changed over time and/or the nature of shocks has been altered by 
the EMU itself. Hence, a structural identification on economic variables that 
may have changed can be misleading. One can argue that the increase in 
correlation in supply disturbances may be due to a larger role for oil price 
shocks in the sample. Proponents of using the nominal price of oil in 
empirical models of the transmission of oil price shocks tend to conclude that 
there is no stable dynamic relationship between percent changes in the 
nominal price of oil and inflation. There is evidence from in-sample fitting 
exercises, however, of a predictive relationship between suitable nonlinear 
transformations of the nominal price of oil and real output. The most 
successful of these transformations is the Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI) 
measure from Hamilton (2003). Let    denote the nominal price of oil in logs, 
then   
      {
      (          )                (          )   
                                                                                       
   (6) 
The net oil price increase is a censored predictor that assigns zero weight to 
net oil price decreases and singles out oil prices peaks in a 36-month (or 
shorter) window. To construct a Net Oil Price Index, we use the Brent Europe 
crude oil price index at a monthly frequency and identify the net increases 
(Figure 3.) Based on this characterization, we define dummy variables at a 
yearly frequency. In particular, we identify the following net oil increases 
*                           +. When conditioning the VAR on the NOPI, 
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we find little evidence that this is relevant in this framework and that the 
responses of real GDP and inflation to demand and supply innovations are 
driven by net oil price increases (results also remain broadly unchanged if we 
use the change in the price of oil as exogenous variable instead).   
Figure 3 – Net Oil Price Increases Indicator  
 
 
Figure 4: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances relaxing the over-identifying 
restriction and conditional on NOPI (bootstrapped residuals – median values) 
 
Note: This figure reports median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000 VAR replications. 
Structural residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above is 
imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample 
for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  The SVAR is conditional on NOPI dummies (Cf. Results’ section). 
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5. Conclusions 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is a seminal paper because, inter alia, it is 
one of the first to point out the risks of an entrenched core-periphery to the 
then nascent EMU. Their influential diagnostics was based upon data 
covering 25 years from 1963 to 1988. Using the same methodology, sample, 
and time window, this paper replicates their results for 1989-2015. We ask 
whether the EMU strengthened or weakened the core-periphery pattern. 
Using a new over-identifying restriction test, our results suggest the EMU has 
significantly weakened the original pattern described in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, in that we find, based on demand and supply shocks, changes in 
the clustering of countries. 
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Appendix (Supplementary Material) 
 
Appendix 1:  Estimation  
The methodology used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is an extension of 
the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure for decomposing permanent and 
temporary shocks. Consider a system where the true model is represented by 
an infinite moving average of a (vector) of variables,   , and shocks,   . Using 
the lag operator L, a bi-variate VAR featuring real GDP and its deflator can be 
written as an infinite moving average representation of demand and supply 
disturbances: 
                                 ∑  
     
 
      (1.1) 
where    ,       -  and the matrices   represent the impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of  . It follows that  
[
   
   
]  ∑   [
        
        
]    [
   
   
]       (1.2) 
where   and    represent the logarithm of output and prices and    are        
disturbances, which identify supply and demand shocks (Ramey, 
forthcoming). For the i-th country,      represents element    , in matrix    
and so on. 
This framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on output, 
while demand shocks have temporary effects. Both have permanent 
(opposite) effects on prices. The cumulative effect of demand shocks on the 
change in output must be zero:  
 ∑       
 
            (1.3) 
Nauro F. Campos & Corrado Macchiarelli 
             
11 
So it can be estimated using a VAR. Each element can be regressed on lagged 
values of all the elements of  . Using B to represent these estimated 
coefficients: 
                                    
 (   ( ))
  
          (1.4) 
 (   ( )   ( )   )   
                         
where    represents the residuals from the VAR equations. In order to convert 
(1.4) into the model in (1.2) under (1.3), the residuals from the VAR,   , are 
transformed into demand and supply shocks. Using the standard relation 
between the VAR’s residuals (  ) and demand and supply shocks, i.e.     
    , it is clear that, for each country, exact identification of the C matrix 
requires four restrictions. Two are normalizations, which define the variance 
of the shocks     and    . The third restriction is from assuming that demand 
and supply shocks are orthogonal to each other. The fourth that demand 
shocks have only temporary effects on output (equation 1.3).  
The standard AD-AS model implies that demand shocks should raise prices 
in both the short and long run, while supply shocks should lower prices and 
increase demand permanently. In order to achieve that, it suffices to impose 
the additional over-identifying restriction in the VAR that supply shocks have 
permanent effects on output. We need to impose this restriction in our sample 
for the demand and supply shocks to be identified. This differs from Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1993) because they do not impose this last restriction, which 
leaves the model exactly identified. One reason we adopt the proposed over-
identifying restriction is that inflation differentials are often considered a 
‘normal feature of currency unions. Therefore, we pay particular attention to 
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modelling the effect of shocks on demand. The role of co-movements in 
output’s cyclical fluctuations is further in line with the business-cycle 
literature. Since the proposed over-identifying restriction is sufficient to get 
structural disturbances in line with AD-AS dynamics, any additional long-run 
restriction may be redundant in this setting. 
We test for the above over-identifying restriction, by imposing ∑       
 
   , 
where    . Under the latter assumption, demand across each country is 
restricted to respond qualitative (sign) and quantitative (size) in the same way 
to supply shocks. In terms of the structural VAR analysis, this implies:  
∑ [
        
        
]    [
      
      
]  [
  
  
]       (1.5) 
We do not restrict   a priori; instead, we vary   in the interval [0.1, 2] as shown 
in Table 2A.  
In order to construct a test for the over-identifying restriction described 
above, we estimate the SVAR model consistent with Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). Differently from the latter, we bootstrap the original VAR 
residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate K = 10.000 data sets.  For each of the 
k-th samples we proceed with a structural analysis and test for the over-
identifying restriction based on a LR-test. We record the number of rejections 
of the over-identifying restriction test at each bootstrap replication, and 
calculate  
           
∑ {     |  (     )   
  (
    
 
)
 }
   
 
   
 
 
where    and     are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log likelihood 
function of the unrestricted and restricted regressions, respectively. Under   , 
the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
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to the number of long-run restrictions ( ) minus (    )  , where   is the 
VAR-dimension (in this case    ). We calculate      for different values of 
 .  
Based on the results in Table 2A, we chose the value of   which minimizes the 
total number of rejections in our sample. Demand and supply shocks are then 
retrieved by bootstrap, in particular recalculating the VAR parameters (K = 
10.000), identifying the SVAR and considering median values of structural 
disturbances under    .  
 
 
Appendix 2: Data   
Annual data: Annual data on real and nominal GDP spanning the period 
1989 - 2015 (Portugal 1989 - 2014) were collected from the OECD Annual 
National Accounts for the 12 members of the EC. As in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993), Germany is used as a numeraire country. For each 
country growth and inflation were calculated as the first difference of the 
logarithm of real GDP (OECD base year) and the implicit GDP deflator. In 
line with BE the deflator was used to measure prices since it reflects the price 
of output rather than the price of consumption. Some descriptive statistics of 
the raw data are presented in Table 1A. The series used in the VAR were 
corrected for different regimes in mean, before 1992 – consistent with the pre-
Maastricht period, as well as the British sterling and Italian lira EMS dismissal 
– and after 2007. 
Monthly data: Crude Oil Prices: Brent - Europe, Dollars per Barrel, not 
seasonally adjusted (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – FRED 
Database). The series is seasonally adjusted using a standard X12 ARIMA 
model. 
Core and Periphery in the European Monetary Union 
 
14 
Legend (in alphabetical order):  
BE = Belgium 
DE = Germany  
DK = Denmark  
ES = Spain 
FR = France 
GR = Greece 
IE = Ireland 
IT = Italy 
NL= Netherlands 
PT = Portugal 
UK = United Kingdom 
 
 
Appendix 3: Results 
Table 1A: Standard deviation and correlation coefficients with Germany: Log of raw data 
 
 Growth Inflation 
 
St. dev Correlation St. dev Correlation 
     
BE 1.450 0.749 0.959 0.597 
DE 2.125 1 1.225 1 
DK 1.915 0.628 1.019 -0.121 
ES 2.312 0.528 2.158 0.463 
FR 1.472 0.750 0.760 0.325 
GR 3.927 0.167 5.732 0.641 
IE 3.875 0.452 2.701 -0.045 
IT 1.911 0.778 1.923 0.546 
NL 1.936 0.730 0.975 -0.089 
PT 2.501 0.618 3.290 0.689 
UK 1.706 0.330 1.768 0.400 
     
Note: All variables are measured in log percent, so e.g. 2.125 for Germany indicates 
approximately standard deviation of 2.125 percent. 
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Table 2A: Test for over-identifying restrictions’ count (% of bootstrap replications) 
 
# of 
rejections 
      
 
# of 
rejections 
      
 
# of 
rejections 
    
 
# of 
rejections 
      
 
# of 
rejections 
    
 
BE 100.0 66.2 17.4 53.5 83.9 
DE 99.8 94.0 25.1 18.3 47.1 
DK 100.0 95.6 35.5 16.2 36.8 
ES 99.8 99.0 74.2 35.4 21.8 
FR 100.0 77.5 20.3 39.3 68.5 
GR 94.6 100.0 92.5 63.5 35.8 
IE 100.0 100.0 98.4 86.8 64.9 
IT 100.0 69.4 14.6 51.8 84.9 
NL 100.0 93.7 20.2 17.3 50.0 
PT 100.0 99.9 89.2 53.2 24.8 
UK 99.8 94.0 50.2 27.2 33.6 
      
Total largest 
EZ3 
99.9 86.7 30.9 32.4 54.5 
Total largest 
EZ5 
99.9 88.4 21.9 25.0 55.2 
Total EZ9 99.4 88.9 50.2 46.6 53.5 
No of countries 
> threshold 11 11 4 5 4 
Note: We bootstrap the original VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate 10.000 data sets. 
For each of the 10.000 samples we recalculate the VAR parameters. At each replication we 
proceed with the SVAR analysis proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and further 
impose the over-identifying restriction by counting the number of rejections. Cut off value is that 
of a χ2(1) with probability 0.999 (10.828). The results are robust if this probability is reduced to 
0.99 (6.635). The countries for which this restriction is rejected on average more than in 50.5% 
of cases are the ones for which the over-identifying restriction is relaxed. For consistency of the 
results, the number of cases the SVAR does not converge is excluded from the count.  
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Table 3A: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances vis-à-vis Germany imposing the 
over-identifying restriction 
  Supply shocks Demand shocks 
BE 0.750 0.360 
DE 1 1 
DK -0.029 0.005 
ES 0.594 -0.019 
FR 0.216 0.164 
GR 0.599 0.047 
IE 0.508 0.335 
IT 0.859 0.039 
NL 0.223 0.205 
PT 0.614 0.152 
UK 0.368 -0.096 
Note: Structural disturbances are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction 
described in Section 3 is imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal. The reported values are median values based on 10.000 bootstrap replications. The 
sample is 1989 – 2015, with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant 
as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
 
 
Table 4A: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances vis-à-vis Germany relaxing the 
over-identifying restriction for Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal 
  Supply shocks Demand shocks 
BE 0.750 0.360 
DE 1 1 
DK -0.029 0.005 
ES -0.594 -0.019 
FR 0.216 0.164 
GR -0.599 0.047 
IE 0.508 -0.335 
IT 0.859 0.039 
NL 0.223 0.205 
PT 0.614 -0.152 
UK 0.368 -0.096 
Note: Structural disturbances are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction 
described in Section 3 is imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal. The reported values are median values based on 10.000 bootstrap replications. The 
sample is 1989 – 2015, with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant 
as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
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Figure 1A: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances vis-à-vis Germany imposing the 
over-identifying restriction 
 
Note: Structural disturbances are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction 
described in Section 3 is imposed for all countries. The sample is 1989 – 2015, with the SVAR 
being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993). Comparisons of Figure 1 and 1A shows that there are no substantial differences in the 
results, whether residuals are bootstrapped or not.  
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Figure 2A: SVAR Impulse Response Functions (cumulated) relaxing the over-identifying 
restriction for Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal
 
Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). 
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993. 
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Note: IRFs report based on 10.000 VAR replications. The black line denotes the median IRF, 
whereas the dotted lines denote its 66% confidence interval. Structural residuals are retrieved 
from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction described in Section 3 is imposed for all 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample is 1989 – 2015, 
with the SVAR being solved using 2 lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993).  
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Figure 3A: SVAR IR Functions (demand) imposing the over-identifying restriction 
 
Note: IRFs report median values based on 10.000 VAR replications. 
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Figure 4A – SVAR IR Functions (demand) relaxing the over-identifying restriction for 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal 
 
Note: IRFs report median values based on 10.000 replications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Belgium Germany Denmark
Spain France Greece
Ireland Italy Netherlands
Portugal UK
IRFs to demand shocks
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Belgium Germany Denmark
Spain France Greece
Ireland Italy Netherlands
Portugal UK
IRFs to supply shocks
Nauro F. Campos & Corrado Macchiarelli 
             
31 
Figure 5A: Correlation of supply and demand disturbances vis-à-vis Germany, pre and post 
euro introduction 
 
Note: The figure compares estimates from pre-Maastricht based on Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993), covering the period 1963-1988, with our equivalent estimates for the period 1989-2015 
(‘post’). For each country, we estimate a bi-variate SVAR using (log) real GDP and the (log) 
deflator, both in first differences. The structural identification of the shocks for our sample 
relaxes the over-identifying restriction for Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal.  
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Figure 6A: SVAR IR Functions (demand) relaxing the over-identifying restriction for 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal and conditional on NOPI 
 
Note: IRFs report median values based on 10.000 replications. The SVAR is conditional on NOPI 
dummies. 
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